Thereareexceptions,however.Forexample,D.GaleJohnson,inhis"ResourceAllocationunderShareContracts,"JournalofPoliticalEconomy（April,1950）,isreluctanttoaccepttheinefficiencyargumentinspiteofhistheoreticalmodelwhichsupportsit.JohnLossingBuckandJamesO.Brayargueagainsttheinefficiencythesisonthegroundsthatobservationsoflanduseundersharecontractsfailtoconfirmthetraditionalbelief.SeeJ.L.Buck,ChineseFarmEconomy（Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1930）；andJ.O.Bray,"FarmTenancyandProductivityinAgriculture:TheCaseoftheUnitedStates,"FoodResearchInstituteStudies（1963）.Weshalldiscussthisinchapter3.
[2].InthePhilippines,forexample,therentalsharerestrictionwascarriedoutsimultaneouslywithaprogramofpulsoryredistributionofland.SeeFrateBull,"PhilippineLandReform,1950-1958,"InternationalCooperationAdministration,USOMIPhilippines（Manila,1958）.
B.TheNatureandOriginofTaiwanLandReform
Thedefinitionofalandreformhasbeenacontroversialconceptintheliteratureoflandtenure.Buttheterm"landreform"asusedherehasasimplemeaning.Itentailschangesinlawspertainingtolandownershipwhichaffectwealthdistributionorresourceallocation.
InTaiwan,forexample,themuchpublicizedfarmlandreformdidnotspringupatonetime:itwastheproductofaseriesofelaborateadjustmentsandenforcementsofthelawsalreadyinexistence.AftertheJapaneseretrocessionofTaiwantoChinain1945,theChinesecodeoflawpertainingtolandrightscameintoforce.Thissetoflaws,thecrucialarticlesofwhichwillbediscussedinthenextsection,hasundergonerapidmodificationsinceApril1949.Inthefollowingfouryears,atotalofover350articleswereappendedtodefinetheTaiwanlandreform.[1]Despiteitsplexity,wemaygenerallydividethereformintothreephases.
Thefirstphaseinvolvedarentlimitationprogram,underwhichtherentalpercentagewasreducedfromanestimatedmeanof56.8percenttoauniformlegalmaximumof37.5percentoftheannualcropyield.Duringthisphase,twosetsofprovisionswereestablished.Thefirstsetincludeseighteenarticles,promulgatedandenforcedinTaiwanfromApril14,1949.[2]Thesecondsetincludesthirty-onearticles,promulgatedonJune7,1951,andintendedtogointoeffectinFebruary1952.[3]Whiletheprovisionsofbothwillbeexaminedinlaterchapters,itistheeconomicimplicationsofthefirstsetuponwhichIshallconcentrate,forIcouldfindnoevidencethatthesecondsetwasactuallyenforced.
Thesecondphaseofthelandreformpertainstothesaleofpubliclandstoestablishowner-farmers.[4]Thisprogram,promulgatedinJune1951andcarriedoutfromJuly1951toJune1953,coveredaportionoffarmlandswhichwereunderstateownershipandhadbeenleasedtotenants.Themagnitudeoffarmingresourcesaffectedbythisprogramwasverysmall.[5]ThethirdphaseisthemostplexandisgenerallyregardedasthemainpartofthelandreforminTaiwan.Itinvolvedthepromulgationandenforcementofthe"Land-to-the-TillerAct,"beginninginJanuary1953.Underthisprogram,landholdingsofaprivatelandownerinexcessofthreehectareswerepulsorilypurchasedbythegovernment.Thepensationofferedwastwoandone-halftimesthegrossannualyieldofthelandbeingpurchased,paidbytheissuanceoflandbondsandindustrialstocksofgovernmententerprises.Thepurchasedlandswereresoldtotenantsinstipulatedparcelsatthesamenumericalprices,tobepaidforinten-yearinstallmentsatnointerestcharge.Afterthispulsoryredistributionofland,transfersoflandrightsamongindividualswereprohibited.[6]NeitherthesecondnorthethirdphaseoftheTaiwanlandreformwillbecoveredinthisstudy.
Despitethefactthatthereformprovisionsareseveralandvaried,twomonpolicyintentionscanbedetected.Firstisthepolicyattackingtenancyeitherbyinterveninginthetermsofthecontractto"protect"thetenantsorbyabolishingtenancyaltogether.Asecondintentionistoforcearedistributionofwealthinfavorofthetenants.ThelawmakersandreformofficialsinTaiwanhadlittledifficultyjustifyingtheirreformmeasures.Oneclaimedthattheexistingpropertysystemwassimplyoutofdate:
LandreforminTaiwanwascarriedoutatjusttherighttime.Thetimewasopportunebecausebythenthelandlordshadoutlivedtheirusefulnessandlandownershiphadbeeanobstacletofurtherdevelopmentofagricultureaswellasindustry……Withthelimitedfarmlandandtheirrationaltenuresystem,ruralunderemploymentpresentedaseriousproblem.[7]
Asecondjustificationofferedisthatfarmingundertenancy,andsharetenancyinparticular,iseconomicallyinefficientonthreecounts.[8]（1）Land-leasecontractswereusuallyshort-termornonperpetual.Thisdeprivedtenantsofsecurityandthereforewasinefficient.（2）Thetenant'sincentivetofarmwasdiscouragedbyasharecontract,sincepartofeveryunitofoutputproducedwouldgotothelandownerasrent.（3）And,sincetherentalscollectedbylandownerswereexorbitantlyhigh,thetenantslackedtheabilitytoinvest.
Athirdjustificationofferedbyreformersisthattenantswereexploitedbylandowners.Inadditiontothehighrent,asharecontract,theyclaimed,wasadeviceofexploitation.However,theevidencetheycitetosupportthe"exploitation"argumentisperhapscontradictorytotheirclaimofinefficienttenancy:forexample,landownersfrequentlystipulatedthattheirtenantsprovideseedsandfertilizers,andrequiredthattheyworkhard.[9]